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RETHINKING THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE AND
RECKLESSNESS
Nikhi! Narayanan*
INTRODUCTION
The whole jurisprudence underlying the law of negligence and recklessness
requires rethinking, both in Indian and in English law. Negligence and recklessness,
are perhaps the most contentious issues in English criminal law today. Seldom has
a single case caused havoc in the sphere of law by confusing basic concepts for over
a decade. R. v. Caldwell, 1 caused such confusion, by reading the conceptual basis
of negligence into recklessness. This position has been adopted by the English courts
for over a decade now. Further, the fundamental questions as to the basis of
punishing negligence, and how it fits into the general scheme of criminal law,
remains unanswered.
TRADITIONAL

NOTIONS

OF RASHNESS

AND NEGLIGENCE

If a person foresees that an outcome is the probable consequence of his act,
but does not desire it, and carries out the act regardless, in the hope that the foreseen
consequence will not happen, it is a rash or reckless act (as defined by the House
Hence it amounts to unjustified risk
of Lords in the case of R. v. Cunningham2).
taking, where the harmful result is not desired. In the case of In re Nidamarti
Nagabushan,3 Holloway, J. opined:
"Culpable rashness is acting with consciousness that mischievous and the
illegal consciousness may follow, but in the hope that they will not and often
with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent its
happening" .
On the other hand, negligence is a state of affairs where harm is caused though
the accused neither intended or foresaw the harm. Criminal negligence imports the
concept of a 'reasonable man' from tort law. Failure to meet this objective standard
incurs punishment. It is immaterial as to whether the accused did not even consider
the possible outcome for. He ought to have done so as a reasonable man, and in
failing to do this was negligent, and hence punishable. In Nidamani's case the court
observed:
"Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and
mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor

*

IV Year, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University.
[1981] 1 All ER 961. (Hereinafter Caldwell.)

2
3

[1957] 2 All ER 412. (Hereinafter Cunningham.)
7 Mad HeR 119 as cited in 3 Gour, H.S., Penal Law of India 2141 (1967). (Hereinafter Nidamani).
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has not exercised the caution incumbent on him, and that if he had, he would
have had the consciousness. The immutability arises from the neglect of the
civil duty of circumspection".4
Thus in both recklessness and negligence the consequence is undesired, but
while in recklessness it is foreseen, in negligence it is not. Hence many distinguished
jurists such as Salmond5 and Glanville Williams6 classify recklessness, and negligence as essentially two branches of the same tree. By this concept, advertent
negligence is recklessness, but inadvertent negligence is simple negligence.
However Turner7 criticises this linkage of negligence with intention. According to him, recklessness is a lower form of mens rea, where there is foresight, but
no desire. On the other hand, it would be a misnomer to call negligence a form of
mens rea. In negligence there is neither foresight nor intention, and the mind is
blank. Recklessness is therefore related to intention and not to negligence. Therefore
to call recklessness advertent negligence is a contradiction in terms.
The Cunningham definition has certain flaws inspite of the fact that it has
clearly distinguished the concepts of rashness and negligence. The rigid requirement
of foresight in the mind of the accused, makes the Cunningham test under-inclusive
according to Andrew Ashworth.s In Caldwell Lord Diplock, criticising the
Cunningham test, felt that the requirement of proof of foresight in the mind of the
accused created difficulties for the jury. He observed that as per this test even harm
caused by glaringly obvious risks would escape punishment if the accused had failed
to perceive them, on the other hand while harm caused by negligible risks that a
prudent, reasonable man would take, would incur punishment. Another problem is
that if a person foresaw the risks, but in all honesty thought that he had taken
adequate provisions to prevent the risk from happening, he would still be guilty of
recklessness. It would be more accurate to classify it as a case of negligence, for
failing to meet the objective standard of care expected of a reasonable man.
In Caldwell, Lord Diplock gave a new definition to recklessness. In this
judgment Lord Diplock was critical of the traditional test of foresight in recklessness
on two grounds: Firstly that it created confusion in the mind of the jury, and secondly
that he felt it was no less blameworthy for a person to have failed to foresee the
consequences of his action, than to foresee it and run the risk. Accordingly, he held
that obvious risks, even if not foreseen should come within the definition of
recklessness.

4

7 Mad HeR 119.

5

Manning (Ed.), Salmond on Jurisprudence 409 (1930).

6

G. Williams, A Textbook of Criminal Law 91 (1988).

7
8

C. Turner (Ed.), Russel on Crime 41 (1986).
A. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 186 (1986).
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He held that with the substitution of the word 'recklessly' in place of the word
'maliciously' in the Criminal Damage Act of 1971, recklessness was given a new
meaning to cover situations where the accused failed to foresee the risk. He opined
that failure to give thought to whether one's actions could cause harm, were as
culpable as foreseeing the consequences and running the risk. It should therefore
come under the purview of recklessness. Thus in assessing whether the accused was
acting in a reckless manner, it is not unjustified to examine how a normal prudent
individual would react if similarly placed, and so the term recklessness must include
not only situations where the accused foresaw the risk, but also situations where the
risk was such that he ought have foreseen it.
Lord Edmund Davies, though concurring with the decision given by Lord
Diplock, differed with him on this particular issue. He rejected Lord Diplock's
criticism of the definition of reckless given by Kenny, using the term in its popular
sense. Lord Edmund Davies opined that law in action required its own dictionary,
and that Kenny was merely elucidating the term as used by lawyers in the purely
legal sense of the word.
He endorsed the earlier view, where the subjective state of mind of the accused
and foresight of harm was the criterion in identifying recklessness and held that the
objective standard of a reasonable man as used in the assessment of negligence could
not apply to recklessness.

IDENTIFYING THE CAWWELL

RATIO

From a purely conceptual level, Caldwell has confused the concepts of
recklessness and negligence. By importing the objective standard of an 'obvious and
serious risk' without looking into the foresight of the accused, the courts have read
the basis of negligence into recklessness.9 This is not a mere semantic distinction.
In English law, recklessness is at a much higher level of mens rea than negligence,
and is more heavily penalised.
The most appalling aspect of this confusion is that the court did not have to
adopt the approach it did in order to dismiss the appeal. In this regard Lord Edmund
Davies' judgment has not been given the importance it deserves. Lord Edmund
Davies reached the same conclusion as Lord Diplock did - that self induced
drunkenness was not an excuse to a crime of recklessness. Lord Edmund Davies
concluded that self induced drunkenness could only be applied to crimes of specific
intent, whereas recklessness was an example of a crime of basic intent. There was
no need for Lord Diplock to deviate from the test established in Cunningham.
Lord Diplock' s observation that it was no less blameworthy for a person to fail
to foresee a risk, than to foresee it and take it, is similar to Hart's justification for
9

It is interesting to note that in the case of Turner v. State, 65 GA App 296, c.f. W.R. Lafave,
Modem Criminal Law: Cases, Comments, and Questions 140 (1978), there was a confusion along
the same lines when an American court read the concept of recklessness into negligence.
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Hart justifies punishing negligence on the ground that it
to exercise one's capacity for thought, in order to avoid the
Lord Diplock has confused this rationale for negligence, by
man standard' into recklessness, and has thus caused much
concepts.

Due to this difference in opinion between Lord Diplock and Lord Edmund
Davies, it is not clear as to what exactly the ratio of the case is. While Lord Edmund
Davies, followed the old test for determining negligence, and Lord Wilberforce
concurred with him, Lord Diplock favoured a new meaning, and Lord Keith, and
Lord Roskill concurred with him. The common ground between Lord Edmund
Davies, and Lord Diplock is that self induced drunkenness cannot be a defence to
recklessness, as it is a defence only to crimes of basic intent. It is submitted that since
this was the focal point of both their judgments, it appears more likely that is the
ratio, and not Lord Diplock test for recklessness, as is commonly supposed.
Therefore his test should be considered as obiter dicta, and the courts need not be
bound by this test. It is submitted that not enough importance has been placed on
Lord Edmund Davies' judgment. It is unclear therefore, as to exactly what the ratio
of Caldwell is. Almost all decisions after Caldwell, from the case of R. v. Lawrence11
onwards appear to have treated the new definition of recklessness, as given by Lord
Diplock as the ratio. However, recently cases such as R. v. Savage and Parameter12
have held that Caldwell has not overruled Cunningham, and that in certain cases the
old test of recklessness applies. This again throws open the question, as to what the
ratio of Caldwell actually is.
This confusion of the concepts of negligence and recklessness, has caused
immeasurable damage. By importing the standard of a 'reasonable man', the court
is ignoring considerations such as age, maturity, and the mental capacity of the
accused, which were considered by the Cunningham test.
In Elliot v. C.,13 where a fourteen year girl who was out without food or sleep,
lit a carpet, and consequently destroyed a shed, without having foresight of the
consequences, and the court convicted her as per the Caldwell test. In Stevenson
Malcolm v. R.,14 the court convicted a boy who threw a petrol bomb into a house
to scare the inhabitants of arson, without realising that he was endangering lives that
by doing so, as it would be obvious to a reasonable person of his age.

10 H.L.A. Hart, Negligence, mens rea, and criminal responsibility in Guest (Ed.), Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence 29 (1961).
11 [1981] 1 All ER 972.
12 [1991] 4 All ER 968.
13 [1983] 2 All ER 1002.
14 (1984) 79 Cr App Rep 334,

d. Smith and Hogan, Criminal Law 60 (1988).
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There is a lacuna in the Caldwell test. If a person considers a risk, and having
decided he had taken enougb precautions to prevent its bappening, be will not be
guilty as per the Caldwell test.
In the past 4 years there have been a spate of cases which have created even
more confusion in these areas. A dual test has been established where Caldwell is
applicable in some areas and Cunningham applicable in others. The case of Savage
and Parameter1S held that Caldwell had not overruled Cunningham, and that
foresight of the consequences as interpreted in R. v. Mowatt,16 was essential for
determining recklessness. However in a later case R. v. Reid,11 it was held that in
the case of reckless driving no foresight was required and recklessness could be
merely a matter of fact, as indicated by Caldwell. Thus, there is a clear need for
legislation to clarify this area of law.
TO WHAT EXTENT
IN INDIAN LA W

HAVE THESE

CONCEPTS BEEN DIFFERENTIATED

By including rash and negligent acts in a single section, the IPC seems to
accept the premise that rash and negligent acts are related, with rash act being a
branch of negligence. However the expression used in the IPC is 'rash or negligent',
which implies that though they are related they are not the same. The same act
therefore, cannot be both rash as well as negligent. Though in many cases courts
have used the phrase 'rash and negligent' act, they do not mean that both are the same.
They are referring to a rash act, which as has been pointed out earlier, is a branch
of negligence. It is unfortunate that the courts have used this expression, as it leads
to confusion. IS
Notwithstanding this semantic error, the courts have clearly distinguished the
two concepts. Though "rash or negligent", has not been defined as such in
s. 304-A, the parameters are laid down - that the rash or negligent act must not
amount to culpable homicide, and therefore also not amount to murder. This
establishes that the mens rea required for a rash or negligent act is lesser than the
mental element for culpable homicide and murder. It is also important to note that
rash and negligent acts have clearly been differentiated by the use of the word or,
and they each have their own separate mens rea.
In the case of Tika Ram v. Rex19 the court clearly differentiated
of negligence and rashness. Agarwal, J. opined:

the concepts

"A negligent act is an act done without those precautions which a reasonable
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
15 [1991] 4 All ER 978.
16 [1967] 3 All ER 47.
17 [1992] 2 All ER.
18 Shivaputra Haddapa v. State. 1970 Cri L J 1551, and Meera Pun v. State. 1971 Cri L J 539.
19 AIR 1950 All 300.
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human affairs would do, or an act which a prudent or reasonable man would
not do in the circumstances attending it. A rash act is a negligent act done
precipitatiously. Negligence is the genus of which rashness is a species. It has
sometimes been observed that rashness is an act done precipitatiously with the
consciousness that the illegal and mischievous act may follow, but with the
hope that they will not. But it is not necessary that there should always be this
consciousness in a rash act. It has been observed in negligence there are no
such consequences."
Rashness involves foresight of the harm, and if the accused did not foresee the
risk, no matter how obvious it may be to the reasonable man, it is not a rash act. Thus
the different mental requirements, and the different rationales for punishment have
clearly been differentiated by the Indian judiciary. However, though these two
concepts have been distinguished at the theoretical level, the sentencing policy
adopted by the courts does not reflect it. Most of the cases involving s. 304-A, which
come up before the High Courts and Supreme Court result in acquittal. Most of the
convictions have been in cases of negligence.20 There are wide fluctuations in
punishment for the same category of offence. Most of the convictions were for
negligence, with hardly any convictions for rash acts. Even for the same type of
negligent acts, there is no uniform sentencing pattern.
AREAS

OF CONFUSION

IN INDIAN

LAW

One of the problems with the approach taken by the courts, is that even if a
person honestly believes that he has taken reasonable precautions to ensure that the
harmful consequence will not follow, he will be guilty of rashness. This is antithetical to the definition of a rash or reckless act. The courts have adopted the view that
if a person foresaw the possible harmful consequence of his act, but carried on the
risk in the hope that it would not happen, he would be guilty of negligence. The
criminality lies in indifference to the consequences. However, this is clearly not the
case where a person who believed he had taken adequate precautions caused the
harm. It would be more accurate to say that inspite of his taking precautions, these
precautions do not amount to the standard of care expected of a reasonable man, and
is hence negligence and not recklessness.
Secondly, although at a conceptual level, these two concepts have been distinguished in the earlier cases, the current trend is merely to convict under s. 304-A,
without specifying whether it was a rash or negligent act. In most cases there is a
differentiation of rash and negligent acts, but there are a few cases where the courts
have confused the requirements for rash and negligent acts.

20 See, Khusaldas v. State afM.P., AIR 1960 MP 51; Kailash Chandv. State, AIR 1987 SC 1368;
Shiva Ram v. State, AIR 1965 All 196.

148

National Law School Journal

[1997

One such case is Shiva Ram v. State.21 In this case the court sentenced the
accused to six months imprisonment. It was held that notwithstanding driving with
defective brakes, the fact that the accused drove without rest, he was negligent, as
he endangered others on the road. Till this point, it appeared to be a case of
negligence. However, the court went on to add that the driver foresaw the risk of
driving without taking rest, and took the risk in the hope that no misfortune would
occur. The court held him guilty of negligence. But foresight in the mind in the
accused constitutes recklessness or rashness, not negligence. It is submitted that the
court confused these concepts.
This illustrates a fundamental problem in the IPC. Whereas in English law,
recklessness is considered to be a higher form of mens rea, and carries a greater
penalty in most offences than negligence, in Indian law, both are penalised in s. 304A, and rashness has been defined as a branch of negligence. Therefore, though the
concepts have been clearly distinguished at a conceptual level, if an act is not rash
due to lack of foresight, it is punished for negligence in the same section, and the
courts have not evolved a punishment policy whereby rashness is more strictly
penalised than negligence. Therefore, unless rash and negligent acts are made two
separate offences in different sections with different punishments, the distinction
evolved by the court will remain a mere semantic nicety.
CONCLUSION
Though Indian courts have clearly distinguished between rash and negligent
acts, the IPC by the construction of s. 304-A treats rashness as a species of
negligence. It would be more accurate to say that rashness is related to intention, as
it involves a lesser degree of mens rea; and as the mind is blank in negligence it
would be difficult to construe negligence itself as a form of mens rea. Perhaps it is
for this reason that the courts have not evolved a uniform sentencing policy
reflecting the different degrees of mens rea for crimes of rashness and negligence.
Therefore, it is submitted that negligence and rashness be separated and put in
different sections so that they can be punished differently.
Secondly, as has been discussed earlier, negligence should be subject to large
fines, but not imprisonment.
Thirdly the definitions of rashness and negligence should be more comprehensively defined so as to include exceptions, and further in rashness the circumstances
in which the risk was taken should be examined. Perhaps the definition given by the
American Model Penal Code could be used as an example.22
21 AIR 1960 All 196.
22 Section 2.08(d) of the Model Penal Code defines negligence as 'A person who acts with respect
to a material element of an offense, should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
material elements exists or will result from the conduct. The risk must be of such a nature that the
actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the cases known
to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard that a reasonable man would observe in the
actorts situation'.
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After the decision of the House of Lords in Caldwell, English law with regard
to the law of crimes is in a deplorable state. Today there is a very weak theoretical
foundation for distinguishing the crimes of negligence, recklessness and intention.
By including foresight of probable consequences in the definition of intention, its
distinction with intention was blurred. In Caldwell, the conceptual basis of negligence was included in the definition of recklessness. However there was no reason
to redefine recklessness at all, as the issue could have been resolved on the issue of
self induced drunkenness alone. This definition was not the basis on which the case
was decided. However until 1991, almost all cases in this area, treated the new
definition as the ratio. Recent cases however have reopened this issue.
Therefore there is a need for a statute comprehensively defining and distinguishing the three states of negligence, recklessness, and intention. Perhaps Fletcher's
recommendation of narrowly defining intention, and leaving the backwash to be
covered in recklessness is the ideal course. There should be gradations within
recklessness, based on factors such as the gravity of the act etc. to determine the
punishment, in recklessness. The old definition of recklessness should be reverted
to, in order to avoid confusion.
Fortunately there is no such confusion in India and the new definition of
recklessness given in Caldwell has no application in Indian law. The courts in
interpreting s. 304-A have clearly distinguished the notions of negligence and
recklessness, and intention. However Indian courts appear to have treated recklessness, as a species of advertent negligence. Therefore the theoretical distinction
evolved is of little practical use, as the courts have yet to develop a sentencing policy
which differentiates the two.
There are several gray areas in the law in India, as the law of negligence, and
recklessness, has not been fully developed by the courts. For example, if the
rationale of punishing recklessness is a criminal failure to exercise one's capacities,
should not the general exceptions, such as accident apply to s. 304-A? This was
tangentially probed in Caldwell, where it was held that self induced intoxication was
not a defense to recklessness. Can these defenses be applied to s. 304-A? S. 6 would
seem to indicate that it does, but this avenue has not been explored by the courts.
In fact this application of the general exceptions to s. 304-A, would mean that the
courts will have to look into the mind of the accused even in negligence.
However the courts have not evolved a punishing policy whereby recklessness
is more heavily penalised, there is a need to place these two states of mind in separate
sections, so as to allow them to be treated differently. There is a need for these two
mental states to be comprehensively defined in the manner adopted in the Model
Penal Code, with a statement as to the exceptions that apply to them in the respective
sections, so as to clarify this area. There should be various gradations of these mental
states, based on exonerating factors to allow for a more comprehensive sentencing
policy. In conclusion, it is submitted that negligence should be subject to high fines,
and not imprisonment, as penal sentences for negligent acts do not fit into the
framework of the IPC.

